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ABSTRACT
Using data for 341 enterprises listed on the Growth Enterprise Market (GEM) of the
Shenzhen Stock Exchange and taking R&D expenditure as an indicator of innovation
investment, this paper implements multiple linear regression to test whether venture
capital promotes corporate innovation input. It also considers the relationship between
the syndicated investment of venture capital and innovation input. The results show
that venture capital indeed promotes R&D in the invested enterprises. The innovation
input of syndicated investment enterprises is significantly higher than that of sole
investment enterprises. Under syndicated investment, the higher the number of
syndicated investment members and the greater the heterogeneity of the shareholding
ratio among the members, the higher is the innovation input. The reputation of the
syndicated investment team, however, has no significant impact on innovation input.
Keywords: Venture capital; Syndicated investment; Innovation input.
JEL Classification: G24.

Article history:
Received
Revised
Accepted
Available online

: January 4, 2019
: March 23, 2019
: April 6, 2019
: April 30, 2019

https://doi.org/10.21098/bemp.v22i1.1036

Published by Bulletin of Monetary Economics and Banking, 2019

1

Bulletin of Monetary Economics and Banking, Vol. 22, No. 1 [2019], Art. 4
30

Bulletin of Monetary Economics and Banking, Volume 22, Number 1, 2019

I. INTRODUCTION
Enterprises are the main players in market economies. Their technological
innovation capabilities are closely related to their performance and growth. More
specifically, factors such as enterprise financing methods, governance structure,
and level of financial market development and related policies will have differing
impacts on enterprise innovation activity. Capital is a decisive input factor, since
financing constraints inhibit innovation activities of enterprises. Generally, the
innovation input of enterprises stems from internal and external financing. The
former refers mainly to enterprises using their own capital investment, while
the latter mainly pertains to banking system (in debt financing markets) and
Venture Capital (VC) (in equity financing markets) (Fei, 2010). In choosing target
borrowers, banks focus mainly on company size, collateral and income level, but
VC is not sensitive to these factors. Therefore, in Small and Medium Enterprises
(SME) financing, VC has several advantages over bank financing (Liang, 2015).
VC can not only provide sufficient funding for enterprises, it also may actively
participate in the management of invested companies. VC provides a range of
value-added services, such as helping to improve corporate governance structure,
providing consultation and support in human resources, among others. VC has
characteristics that differ from traditional financial and industrial capital, and its
new financing method of “financing + cooperating” is highly valued by the Chinese
government. Some local governments in China have already introduced a series
of policies to encourage VC development through tax incentives, other one-off
incentives or subsidies, and loss compensation. For example, if investing eligibly in
unlisted small and medium-sized high-tech enterprises through equity investment
for more than 2 years, a VC enterprise may deduct 70% of the investment amount
from taxable income in the year following the 2-year investment period; when
taxable income for the year is less than the deduction, it may be deducted in the
subsequent tax year.3 Further, VC and Angel investors are allowed to withdraw
risk reserves, which are used to compensate investment losses, based on 10% of the
fund’s long-term investment balance.4 In the current environment, it is especially
important to understand whether VC firms meet policy expectations and play an
important role in promoting corporate innovation.
VC firms face high investment risk, so they often adopt a syndicated investment
strategy; that is, several VC firms jointly invest in a target enterprise. Syndicated
investment is vital in the VC market. Compared with individual investment, it
can not only diversify risk, but also integrate the advantages of each investor
to generate a resource-sharing effect and a value-sharing effect. Therefore, this
syndicated investment strategy is highly favored by both VC firms and invested
companies.
There is little literature on the relationship between VC and enterprise
innovation in China, and research on how the characteristics of VC firms influence
enterprise innovation are even rarer. The relationship between VC and enterprise
3

4

See “Implementation Opinions of the People’s Government of Jiangxi Province on Promoting a
Number of Policy Measures for Mass Entrepreneurship and Innovation.”
See “Implementation Opinions of the People’s Government of Zhejiang Province on Promoting Mass
Entrepreneurship and Innovation.”
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innovation requires additional empirical evidence. To enrich the existing research
on VC and enterprise innovation in China, this paper takes the companies listed
on the GEM market of the Shenzhen Stock Exchange as a sample to explore
the impact of VC on corporate innovation input and the role of the syndicated
investment strategy of VC firms. It also examines the impact of the characteristics
of VC on innovation input under syndicated investment.
This work is significant for several reasons. It is based on VC, a vital
component of the equity financing market,5 and it verifies and supplements prior
research on VC and enterprise innovation. Existing research on the relationship
between VC investment form and strategy and corporate innovation investment
is not sufficient. Therefore, this paper uses a VC syndicated investment sample
to supplement the literature. Further, this paper explores the varying impacts of
various characteristics of syndicated investment teams on enterprise innovation
input, to determine what form of syndicated investment can better enhance
the incubation of innovation. The purpose of this paper is to help improve the
efficiency of incubation of innovation by providing a reference framework for VC
firms to choose syndicated investment partners. In addition, it will help innovative
enterprises choose suitable VC firms.
II. LITERATURE REVIEW AND HYPOTHESIS
A. VC and Enterprise Innovation
It is generally believed that VC is a major factor behind the high level of
technological innovation in American companies (Keuschnigg, 2004). According
to Kortum and Lerner (2000), VC-backed companies are more innovative and have
more valuable patents. Hellmann and Puri (2000, 2002) show that, compared with
non-VC-backed companies, VC-backed companies are more radical in innovation,
the speed at which products are introduced into the market is significantly faster,
and their market strategies are more radical. Tian and Wang (2011) find, from
the perspective of failure tolerance, that Initial Public Offerings (IPO) companies
supported by VC with high risk tolerance are more innovative, and the impact
of failure tolerance on company innovation is on a sustained basis. That is, the
attitude of VC firms toward failure may be internalized by the company and
become part of the corporate culture, which can help the company to form a
unique culture of innovation. However, some research does not fully recognize
the role of VC in promoting corporate innovation. Roosenboom and Popov (2012)
use data from several countries and find that the positive impact of VC exists only
in countries where the VC industry thrives. Further, in countries where VC is
supported by the government, businesses are easy to start, taxation is low, and
the regulatory environment is loose, making it more conducive for VC firms to
promote enterprise innovation.
Zheng and Li (2001) believe that VC plays an irreplaceable role in helping
small- and medium-sized startups. VC can supervise a company’s innovation
activities and use its own rich market experience to guide and correct the direction
5

According to Zhang and Liao (2011) and Chen et al. (2017), this paper does not distinguish between
VC and PE, and collectively refers to both as VC.
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of enterprise innovation. At the same time, participation of VC reduces the degree
of information asymmetry between investors and enterprises. Wu (2009) believes
that the integration of capital and technology brought about by VC capital support
and its participation in enterprise management promotes enterprise innovation.
Fu et al. (2012) find that compared with other institutional investors, VC can better
promote innovation investment in GEM companies. Chen et al. (2017) and Wang
and Hu (2017) also find that VC plays a significant role in improving innovation
performance.
VC firms are professional investors that usually specialize in particular
investment fields. They accumulate industry resources and gain relevant experience
in business management (Chen et al., 2017). VC often participates actively in the
operation and governance of the invested company by joining the board. They use
professional management experience to improve corporate governance structure
and provide support in areas such as strategy making, human resources, and
financing. These value-added services are especially useful in the invested firms’
innovation activities, since they overcome defects in terms of business management
and resources. At the same time, VC can effectively supervise innovation activities
of the invested companies, ensuring their quality and efficiency. Compared with
traditional corporate activities (such as manufacturing and marketing), innovation
activities are always accompanied by high risk stemming from the large amount
of investment, the long-term research and development process, and many other
unpredictable factors (Holmstrom, 1989). Fortunately, the high risk in corporate
innovation activity may bring high returns—investors have a chance to gain
higher exit returns. Accordingly, we propose the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 1: VC participation has a positive impact on corporate innovation.
B. Syndicated Investment and Corporate Innovation Input
As a common investment strategy for VC, syndicated investment has more
advantages than individual investment. For example, syndicated investment
enables resource sharing and provides invested enterprises with rich resources
and value-added services. Moreover, syndicated investment behavior reduces
information asymmetry, conveys a positive signal that the company is worth
investing, thus attracting more investors to fund the company’s innovation
activities (Leland and Pyle, 1977). The literature also finds that syndicated
investment-backed companies have better competence in corporate governance,
and there is a positive correlation between this competence and the number of
syndicated investment members (Shen and Hu, 2014). In addition, Tian (2012)
analyzes 30,861 companies and concludes that syndicated investment can not only
promote incubation of innovative products and improve their market value, it also
improves IPO performance. We thus propose Hypothesis 2:
Hypothesis 2: Compared with sole investment enterprises, innovation input
in syndicated investment enterprises is higher.
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C. Characteristics of Syndicated Investment and Enterprise Innovation Input
The syndicated investment model is favored by VC firms in several countries. But
how will syndicated investment with different characteristics affect enterprise
innovation input? The present paper discusses the relationship between enterprise
innovation input and syndicated investment characteristics, such as number of
investment members, reputation characteristics, and proportion of shareholding.
First, more risk organizations involved in syndicated investment means more
financial support, professional guidance, and other resources. Further, they also
bring a higher level of risk diversification. Lu et al. (2017) show that the innovation
ability of the invested company grows with the number of syndicated investment
institutions. Therefore, we propose Hypothesis 3:
Hypothesis 3: The innovation input of the invested company is positively
correlated with the number of institutions that invest in a syndicated investment.
Reputable VC firms often have rich investment experience and a wellestablished network of relationships. They play a positive role in discovering and
nurturing high-quality enterprises, providing better value-added services and
support for the invested enterprises. Therefore, VC firms with strong reputation
are more attractive, and the enterprises backed by them are undoubtedly
favored by the market. Gompers et al. (1996) suggest that a “reputation chasing
motivation” exists in younger institutions—they try to build their reputation and
raise new funds as soon as possible by listing their invested companies earlier than
do mature institutions. Although this “reputation chasing behavior” can increase
the short-term value of invested companies (for example, reducing R&D expenses
in the short-term can increase profit in the current period), it sacrifices long-term
value. Based on the analysis above, we propose Hypothesis 4:
Hypothesis 4: Firm innovation input is positively correlated with the
reputation of the syndicated investment team.
Finally, differences in shareholding ratio among members of the syndicated
investment will influence investment results. Generally, syndicated investment
can diversify investment risk. If there are large differences in members’ investment
amounts, however, the effect of risk diversification will be nullified. When a
particular member holds a relatively large proportion of shares, moral hazard
tends to occur and other members are prone to “free-riding,” which reduces the
positive impact of syndicated investment on corporate innovation. Therefore, more
dispersed shareholding can diversify investment risk and enable each syndicated
investment member to participate in corporate governance and promote corporate
innovation more actively. Based on the analysis above, we propose our fifth
hypothesis:
Hypothesis 5: The heterogeneity of syndicated investment members’
shareholding ratio is an unfavorable factor in enterprise innovation input.
III. RESEARCH DESIGN
A. Sample and Data
We select firms listed on the GEM market of the Shenzhen Stock Exchange over
the period January 1, 2012 to July 14, 2017 as our initial sample; we use annual
data. On the one hand, the GEM was originally created to provide an ideal exit
Published by Bulletin of Monetary Economics and Banking, 2019
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channel for domestic VC, and it brings together many VC-backed companies. On
the other hand, unlike the main board or SME board, the GEM is more suitable for
listing VC-supported enterprises. Therefore, the Shenzhen GEM, founded in 2009,
provides a good research sample for our study.
Our data comprise three parts: (1) VC data: a sample of VC-backed firms listed
on the Shenzhen GEM from 2012 to 2017 (obtained from CVsource6) and relevant
data on VC firms, such as year of establishment (obtained from Wind7). For data
that cannot be obtained from these databases, we collect data manually through
publicly available resources, such as prospectuses of the listed companies. (2)
Indicator of company’s innovation capability (R&D data), from iFinD8. (3) Relevant
financial information for listed companies, from CSMAR9.
After excluding companies with missing data and financial enterprises, the
final sample includes 341 companies, of which 227 (66.57%) have a VC background
at the time of listing. Judging from yearly data, VC-backed enterprises form the
majority, accounting for more than 60% every year.
B. Variable Definitions
B1. Dependent Variable
Our dependent variable is listed company R&D expenditure. As an indicator
that every listed company must reveal, R&D expenditure is highly available and
representative. It measures company investment in innovation activities and
can reflect company attitude toward them, showing the most timely and direct
performance of company efforts in innovation. Therefore, based on existing
research, this paper takes the natural logarithm of R&D expenditure to measure
company innovation input (Zhan et al., 2015).
B2. Independent Variables
We set two dummy variables, VC (VC) and syndicated investment (Syn). Drawing
on Wu et al. (2012), we judge whether the shareholders of the company are VC
firms by consulting databases, the investment community, the website “sky-eye
inspection10”, and prospectuses. If at least one investing institution among the topten shareholders at the time of listing is a VC firm, the company is regarded as a
VC-backed company, VC=1, otherwise VC=0. If there is more than one VC firms
among the top-ten shareholders, it is a syndicated investment, Syn=1, otherwise it
is considered an independent investment, Syn=0.
SynNum refers to the number of VC firms among the top-ten shareholders
in the syndicated investment sample. Further, the reputation of the syndicated
investment team (SynRep) is measured using the reputation of the leading VC
firms, while the institution’s reputation is measured by its age, that is, the number
of years between establishment of the institution and the IPO of its invested
6
7
8
9
10

See https://www.cvsource.com.cn/
See https://www.wind.com.cn/
See http://www.51ifind.com/
See http://us.gtadata.com/
See https://www.tianyancha.com/
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company. When the age of the leading institution is equal to or greater than 6
years, SynRep=1, otherwise SynRep=0.
Both Gomper (1996) and Hsu (2004) believe that an institution’s age is, to
some extent, a suitable indicator of a ’s experience and reputation. Gomper (1996)
separates high-reputation VCs from low-reputation VCs in terms of whether age
is greater than 6 years. This author finds that there are 12 significant differences
between these two kinds of VC, such as the average amount of subsequent
fundraising, the leading VC’s number of seats in the invested company’s board
and its shareholding ratio in the company. Due to data availability, we also use VC
age to measure reputation, taking 6 years as the dividing line.
In portraying the heterogeneity of VC shareholding ratio, this paper draws
on Beckman and Haunschild (2002) and Lu et al. (2017) to construct a coefficient
of variation for measuring the heterogeneity of the continuous variables, that is,
the ratio of standard deviation to mean of the shareholding ratio. The larger the
ratio, the greater the heterogeneity of the shareholding ratio between different
syndicated investment members. The heterogeneity indicator is built as follows:
		

(1)

where Sharei is the shareholding ratio of VC firms i.
B3. Control Variables
Based on the literature, this paper takes company size, profitability, solvency, and
policy factors as control variables (Chemmanur et al., 2004; Chen et al., 2017; Lu et
al., 2017). Company size (Lnasset) is the natural logarithm of the company’s total
assets at the end of a year; profitability (ROE) is the ratio of company net profit
to total equity at the end of a year; solvency (Lev) is the ratio of company total
liabilities to total assets at the end of a year; policy factor (Lngov) is the natural
logarithm of government subsidies received by the company.
Table 1.
Variable Definition
In this table, all variables appearing in this paper are defined and explained.

Dependent
Variable

Independent
Variables

Variable

Definition

Variable Name

Innovation Input

the natural logarithm of
company R&D expenditure

LnR&D

Venture Capital

dummy variable, VC=1 if it is a VCbacked company, otherwise VC=0

VC

Syndicated
Investment

dummy variable, Syn=1 if it is a
syndicated investment, otherwise
Syn=0

Syn

Number of VC
firms

number of VC firms among the topten shareholders in the syndicated
investment sample

SynNum
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Table 1.
Variable Definition (contd.)
In this table, all variables appearing in this paper are defined and explained.

Independent
Variables

Control Variables

Other Variables

Variable

Definition

Variable Name

Syndicated
Investment Team
Reputation

leading VC firm’s age, dummy
variable, SynRep=1 if the age of
the leading institution is equal to
or greater than 6 years, otherwise
SynRep=0.

SynRep

Heterogeneity of
VC Shareholding
Ratio

VC Shareholding Ratio
Heterogeneity in the year of the
invested company’s IPO

ShareHetero

Company Size

the natural logarithm of the
company’s total assets at the end
of a year

Lnasset

Profitability

the ratio of company net profit to
total equity at the end of a year

ROE

Solvency

the ratio of company total liabilities
to total assets at the end of a year

Lev

Policy Factor

the natural logarithm of
government subsidies received by
the company

Lngov

VC Participation

dummy variable, Inv_after=1
if it is an observation after VC
participation, Inv_after=0 if it is an
observation before VC participation

Inv_after

C. Model Design
To analyze the impact of VC participation on the innovation input of the invested
company, this paper draws on Chen et al. (2017) and builds a model to examine
the difference between enterprises with and without VC participation. At the same
time, it also illustrates how the innovation input of VC-backed companies changes
after VC firms join in.
LnR&Dit = α0 + α1VC*Inv_afterit + αjControlit + Yi + λt + εit 		

(2)

Inv_after is a dummy variable that measures whether a VC firm joins in: Inv_after=1
indicates an observation after VC participation, and Inv_after=0 indicates an
observation before VC participation. VC*Inv_after is the cross term between
VC and Inv_after: value 1 means observation of VC-backed companies after VC
participation, and value 0 means absence of VC participation or an observation
one year before VC participation. Control indicates other control variables, while
Y and l indicate the controls for year and industry fixed effects, respectively.
https://bulletin.bmeb-bi.org/bmeb/vol22/iss1/4
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To verify Hypotheses 2–5, the following model is established:
LnR&Di = α0 + α1Xi + α2Lnasseti + α3Roei + α4Lngovi + α5Levi + εi

(3)

where X refers to syndicated investment characteristics: whether the investment
is syndicated (Syn), number of syndicated investment members (SynNum),
reputation (SynRep), and shareholding ratio (ShareHetero).
D. Descriptive Statistics
Table 2.
Summary Statistics on Main Variables
Use the following to interpret this table. (A) Coefficients significant at the 10%, 5% and 1% level are indicated with *, **, ***,
respectively; the content in () is the t-statistic. (B) For variable definitions, please check Table 1. (C) Only 208 VC-backed companies
received syndicated investment, so Syn has 208 observations, of which 145 companies have complete data in the number of
syndicated investment members (SynNum), reputation (SynRep), and the heterogeneity of shareholding ratio (ShareHetero).

Panel A: the whole sample
Number of
Observations

Mean

Std. Dev.

Min.

Max.

LnR&D

1336

16.713

0.772

11.816

20.858

VC*Inv_after

1336

0.495

0.500

0

1

Syn

208

0.697

0.461

0

1

SynNum

145

3.124

1.269

2

7

SynRep

145

0.710

0.455

0

1

ShareHetero

145

1.694

0.733

0

2.999

Lnasset

1336

19.975

0.713

17.730

23.743

ROE

1336

24.820

13.146

1.475

148.838

Lngov

1336

15.225

1.355

0

19.764

1336

33.992

16.655

1.103

91.070

Variables

Lev

Panel B: companies with and without VC participation
Variables

Companies without VC
Participation
(N=447)

Companies with VC
Participation
(N=889)

Mean

Std. Dev.

Mean

Std. Dev.

LnR&D

16.654

0.786

16.742

0.763

Lnasset

19.961

0.770

19.983

0.683

ROE

27.361

14.861

23.542

12.000

Lngov

15.075

1.463

15.301

1.292

Lev

33.610

17.709

34.184

16.106

Published by Bulletin of Monetary Economics and Banking, 2019
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Table 2 shows summary statistics on the main variables. Panel A refers to the entire
sample. Note that the proportion of observations of VC-backed companies after
VC participation is 49.5%, almost half the whole sample; the average value of
LnR&D is 16.713, with maximum and minimum of 20.858 and 11.816, respectively;
and 69.7% of 208 VC-backed enterprises obtained syndicated investment. As
for syndicated investment characteristics, the average number of syndicated
investment members is 3.124, that is, each company has an average of 3 VC firms
investing jointly; average age of the leading VC is 0.71, which indicates that 71% of
the leading VCs have an age of more than 6 years; average value of shareholding
ratio heterogeneity is 1.694, with the smallest among them 0, which means that
every VC has the same shareholding ratio. Panel B shows T-test results of companies
with and without VC participation: R&D expenditure of VC-backed enterprises
is significantly higher than that of non-VC-backed enterprises; meanwhile, there
are significant differences in Return on Equity (ROE) and government subsidies
between these two kinds of companies.
IV. EMPIRICAL RESULTS AND ANALYSIS
A. VC and Innovation Input
This part shows the main empirical results of this paper and analyzes the
relationship between innovation input and VC/syndicated investment characters.
A1. Endogeneity of VC and Innovation Input
When investing in a venture, VC firms consider factors such as market attractiveness,
strategy, technology, products or services, customer usage, competition, trading
conditions, and the quality and experience of the management team (Kaplan
and Stromberg, 2004). The target company may have its own advantages in
innovation, in which case our research will face endogeneity. Therefore, to rule out
the possibility that the two kinds of companies have different levels of innovation
input before VCs make their investment, this paper performs a regression with the
data of companies without VC participation and VC-backed company observation
one year before VC participation. Table 3 shows the regression results: in all five
columns, the regression coefficients of VC are positive, but they are small and
not significant, which means that R&D expenditure of VC-backed enterprises
before VC participation is not significantly higher than that of non-VC-backed
enterprises in the same time period. Further, we use a Probit regression to examine
the relationship between VC investing decision factors and enterprise innovation
input. If the coefficient of R&D is significant, the R&D expenditure level of the
enterprise can be regarded as an important factor to attract VC; that is, VC firms
pay special attention to the R&D expenditure of the target enterprise when
selecting their investment projects. Thus, this indicates that the difference between
the R&D expenditures of VC-backed enterprises and non–VC-backed enterprises
already exists prior to VC participation. Table 4 shows that the coefficient of R&D
expenditure is not significant, which means that, in our sample, R&D expenditure
may not influence VC investing decisions.
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Table 3.
R&D Before the VC Participation
Use the following to interpret this table. (A) Coefficients significant at the 10%, 5% and 1% level are indicated with *, **, ***,
respectively; the content in () is the t-statistic. (B) For variable definitions, please check Table 1. (C) Column (1) shows the regression
results without control variables, columns (2)-(5) show the results that contain one more control variable than the previous column.

Variables
VC

LnR&D
(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

0.055

0.017

0.084

0.064

0.066

(0.67)

(0.30)

(1.52)

(1.22)

(1.30)

0.745***

0.805***

0.748***

0.827***

(15.48)

(19.09)

(17.55)

(18.48)

0.011***

0.010***

0.010***

(5.99)

(6.09)

(6.48)

0.100***

0.089***

Lnasset
ROE
Lngov

(4.58)
Lev

(4.23)
-0.007***
(-4.61)

Constant
Obs
R

2

15.078***

-0.597

-2.159**

-2.581***

-3.541***

(182.33)

(-0.59)

(-2.39)

(-2.99)

(-4.14)

341

341

341

341

341

0.1690

0.5591

0.5970

0.6224

0.6427

Table 4.
The Relationship between VC’s Investing Decision Factors and the Invested
Company’s R&D Expenditure
Use the following to interpret this table. (A) Coefficients significant at the 10%, 5% and 1% level are indicated with *, **, ***,
respectively; the content in () is the t-statistic. (B) For variable definitions, please check Table 1. (C) Column (1) shows the regression
results without control variables, columns (2)-(5) show the results that contain one more control variable than the previous column.

Variables
LnR&D

VC
(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

0.072

0.039

0.224

0.185

0.202

(0.70)

(0.27)

(1.46)

(1.16)

(1.24)

0.049

-0.212

-0.214

-0.253

Lnasset

(0.32)
ROE

(-1.24)

(-1.26)

(-1.32)

-0.022***

-0.022***

-0.023***

(-3.86)

(-3.83)

(-3.83)

Lngov

0.061

0.062

(0.96)

(0.99)

Lev

0.002
(0.44)

Constant
Obs

-0.753

-1.187

1.463

1.200

1.551

(-0.41)

(-0.52)

(0.59)

(0.48)

(0.59)

341

341

341

341

341
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A2. Analysis of Regression Results
Table 5.
Regression Results of VC and R&D Expenditure
Use the following to interpret this table. (A) Coefficients significant at the 10%, 5% and 1% level are indicated with *, **, ***,
respectively; the content in () is the t-statistic. (B) For variable definitions, please check Table 1. (C) Column (1) shows the regression
results without control variables, columns (2)-(5) show the results that contain one more control variable than the previous column.

Variables
VC*Inv_after

LnR&D
(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

0.032

0.085**

0.075**

0.074*

0.068*

(1.53)

(2.63)

(2.27)

(2.21)

(2.04)

0.374***

0.409***

0.408***

0.398***

(21.88)

(23.13)

(21.54)

(19.56)

0.003***

0.003***

0.003***

(9.04)

(8.94)

(6.10)

Lnasset
ROE
Lngov

0.002

0.003

(0.53)

(0.65)

Lev

0.001*
(2.16)

Constant

15.706***

8.917***

8.121***

8.115***

8.218***

(195.50)

(26.09)

(22.99)

(23.61)

(23.38)

Year

Controlled

Controlled

Controlled

Controlled

Controlled

Industry

Controlled

Controlled

Controlled

Controlled

Controlled

1336

1336

1336

1336

1336

0.0658

0.3370

0.3618

0.3642

0.3454

Obs
R

2

Table 5 shows that VC participation has a significant positive effect on company
R&D expenditure, and the positive effect remains stable when considering other
variables. This may be interpreted as showing that VC participation can promote
R&D expenditure of the invested company. As for the control variables, the firm
size variable (Lnasset) is positive at the 1% significance level, and the profitability
variable (j) is positive at the 10% significance level. These results are reasonable,
because companies with large scale and good profitability may more abundantly
fund R&D activities. Based on the analysis above, Hypothesis 1 is accepted, that is,
VC firms can promote invested companies’ innovation input.
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B. Syndicated Investment and Innovation Input
Table 6.
Regression Results of Syndicated Investment and R&D Expenditure
Use the following to interpret this table. (A) Coefficients significant at the 10%, 5% and 1% level are indicated with *, **, ***,
respectively; the content in () is the t-statistic. (B) For variable definitions, please check Table 1. (C) Column (1) shows the regression
results without control variables, columns (2)-(5) show the results that contain one more control variable than the previous column.
(D) When analyzing the impact of syndicated investment characteristics on company’s innovation input, separate testing of these
factors may overestimate their effects on the dependent variable, so we have also tested all these factors in one model (column 4 in
Panel B), and the results are consistent with the results of the separate tests. Due to space constraints, the regression results of the
control variables are omitted from Panel B. Details can be obtained from authors.

Panel A: syndicated investment and R&D expenditure
Variables
Syn

LnR&D
(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

0.204**
(2.27)

0.116
(1.59)
0.876***
(12.54)

0.141*
(1.95)
0.843***
(11.38)
0.015*
(1.92)

0.145**
(2.00)
0.832***
(11.12)
0.014*
(1.85)
0.021
(1.15)

14.729***
(163.89)
208
0.1837

-4.130***
(-2.73)
208
0.5136

-3.585**
(-2.29)
208
0.5257

-3.69**
(-2.35)
208
0.5278

0.125*
(1.75)
0.790***
(9.93)
0.014*
(1.81)
0.024
(1.31)
0.004
(1.18)
0.004
(1.18)
208
0.5317

Lnasset
ROE
Lngov
Lev
Constant
Obs
R2

Panel B: syndicated investment characteristics and R&D expenditure
Variables
SynNum

LnR&D
(1)

(2)

SynRep

(4)

-0.272***
(-4.25)
145
0.5817

0.145***
(3.66)
0.002
(0.20)
-0.327***
(-4.25)
145
0.6296

0.035
(0.35)

ShareHetero
Obs
R2

(3)

0.104**
(2.15)

145
0.5521

145
0.5264

Table 6 shows regression results of the relationship between syndicated investment
and R&D expenditure. First, syndicated investment has a significant positive
correlation with invested company R&D expenditure, which indicates that
companies supported by VC syndicated investment have higher innovation input
than companies supported by only one VC firms. Second, the positive correlation
between the number of syndicated investment members and company R&D
expenditure means that the greater the number of syndicated investment members,
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the higher the R&D expenditure. Moreover, although the leading VC firms’ age
remains positive with the invested company’s R&D expenditure, the results are not
significant. On the other hand, the coefficient of syndicated investment members’
shareholding ratio heterogeneity is significantly negative, which means that the
smaller the heterogeneity, the more positive the impact of syndicated investment
on R&D investment of the companies. In summary, Hypothesis 2, Hypothesis 3,
and Hypothesis 5 are supported by our empirical evidence.11
C. Robustness Test
This part shows the results of robustness test, in which we created a dummy
treatment group and a randomly selected experimental group.
C1. Dummy Treatment Group
To test the robustness of the conclusion that VC participation promotes enterprise
innovation input, we set a dummy treatment group where VC participation
happens one year later than the reality. The regression results are shown in
Table 7. It is evident that VC participation has no significant positive impact on
R&D expenditure, so the test result of Hypothesis 1 in the preceding section 3 is
credible.
Table 7.
Regression Results of VC and R&D Expenditure (Dummy Treatment Group)
Use the following to interpret this table. (A) Coefficients significant at the 10%, 5% and 1% level are indicated with *, **, ***,
respectively; the content in () is the t-statistic. (B) For variable definitions, please check Table 1. (C) Column (1) shows the regression
results without control variables, columns (2)-(5) show the results that contain one more control variable than the previous column.

Variables
VC*Inv_after

LnR&D
(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

0.005

0.030

0.015

0.015

0.008

(0.25)
Lnasset

(1.06)

(0.55)

(0.53)

(0.27)

0.354***
(30.53)

0.393***
(29.51)
0.003***
(10.67)

0.391***
(28.88)
0.003***
(10.46)
0.004
(0.98)

9.261***
(39.36)
Controlled
Controlled
1336
0.3294

8.369***
(31.23)
Controlled
Controlled
1336
0.3537

8.356***
(31.63)
Controlled
Controlled
1336
0.3574

0.380***
(26.67)
0.003***
(6.96)
0.005
(1.11)
0.002
(3.05)
8.468***
(32.19)
Controlled
Controlled
1336
0.3303

ROE
Lngov
Lev
Constant
Year
Industry
Obs
R2
11

15.691
(209.89)
Controlled
Controlled
1336
0.0649

Due to length limitations, regression results of the control variables are omitted, but are available
upon request.

https://bulletin.bmeb-bi.org/bmeb/vol22/iss1/4
DOI: 10.21098/bemp.v22i1

14

Jiang et al.: VENTURE CAPITAL AND CORPORATE INNOVATION INPUT FROM THE PERSPECTI
Venture Capital and Corporate Innovation Input from the Perspective of Syndicated Investment

43

C2. Randomly Selected Experimental Group
To further test whether our results have omitted-variable bias, we conduct a
placebo test. Specifically, in our sample, there are 227 VC-backed companies out
of 341 companies. We first randomly select 227 companies from all 341 enterprises
and mark them as VC-backed companies (VCR=1), while the rest are designated
non–VC-backed companies (VCR=0). Then, we create a new variable, Fake
=VCR*Inv_after. To avoid the impact of rare events, we repeat the random datagenerating process 500 times; the distribution of the 500 estimated coefficients is
shown in Figure 1. It is evident that the figures are between 0 and 0.1, and our true
estimate (column 5 of Table 7) is the outlier in the placebo test. This indicates that
our estimation results do not have serious bias due to omitted variables.
Figure 1. Distribution of 500 Estimated Coefficients
The X-axis is the estimated coefficients of 500 random VCR*Inv_after, the curve is the density distribution of the estimated values,
and the vertical line is our true estimate (column 5 of Table 7).
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V. CONCLUSION AND POLICY SUGGESTION
This paper examines the relationship between VC and firm innovation input. The
results show that VC participation significantly promotes the R&D investment
of the invested companies. This conclusion coincides with research conclusions
found in the literature, such as Xu et al. (2015) and Gou and Dong (2014). While
providing financial support, VC firms also guide the invested company to spend
more on innovation input by participating in its business decision-making.
Further distinguishing companies that have obtained syndicated investment
versus sole investment, we find that the number of syndicated investment
members has a significant positive correlation with innovation input, while the
heterogeneity of shareholding ratio among syndicated investment members
is negatively correlated with innovation input. These conclusions relating to
syndicated investment characteristics provide a valuable reference for enterprises
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that attach importance to innovation activities in searching for helpful fund
providers, and they also provide a theoretical basis for VC firms to select their
joint partners.
This paper’s conclusions indicate that China should actively encourage
and guide development of the VC industry, and constantly improve its policy,
institutional, and supervision systems. The government could encourage VC firms
to invest in startups through subsidies and tax incentives, among other measures,
and encourage them to adopt a syndicated investment strategy, so that startups
will be able to spend more on R&D, and the innovation incubation system will
become more efficient. In addition, the government could guide more social funds
into the VC industry and reduce investment barriers, thereby broadening the
financing channels for SMEs and providing adequate financial support for their
innovation activities.
Acknowledgement: This research is supported by the Humanity and Social
Science Youth Foundation of the Ministry of Education of China (19C11482075)
& Natural Science Foundation of Zhejiang Province (LY19G010005), China. This
paper is a part of “Venture Capital Helps the Development of Hangzhou Hightech Enterprises”(20190834M26-1) which is a research project of Hangzhou’s
Scientific and Technological Commission, and is also a part of the field research
project (18TYDC042) supported by the Graduate School in Zhejiang University of
Finance & Economics.
REFERENCES
Beckman, C. M., and Haunschild, P. R. (2002). Network Learning: The Effects
of Heterogeneity of Partners’ Experience on Corporate Acquisitions.
Administrative Science Quarterly, 47, 92-124.
Holmstrom, B. (1989). Agency Cost and Innovation. Journal of Economic Behavior
and Organization, 12, 305-327.
Chemmanur, T. J., and Loutskina, E. (2004). The Role of Venture Capital Backing
in Initial Public Offerings: Certification, Screening, or Market Power?. Ssrn
Electronic Journal.
Si, C., Wenlong, H., and Ran, Z. (2017). Venture Capital and Enterprise Innovation:
Impact and Potential Mechanism . Management World, 2017, 158-169.
Keuschnigg, C. (2004). Venture Capital Backed Growth. Journal of Economic Growth,
9, 239-261.
Hongdong, F. (2010). Analysis and Solution of Financing Difficulties in Start-up
Enterprises [D]. Beijing Jiaotong University.
Leiming, F., Dizhen, W., and Yahui, Z. (2012). Is VC a More Active Investor?——
Evidence from Innovation Investment of Listed Companies on GEM. Financial
Research, 10, 125-138.
Gompers, P. A. (1996). Grandstanding in the Venture Capital industry. Journal of
Financial Economics, 42, 133-156.
Yannan, G., and Jing, D. (2014). Research on the Impact of Venture Capital on
Enterprise Technology Innovation. Scientific Research Management, 2014, 35, 3542.
https://bulletin.bmeb-bi.org/bmeb/vol22/iss1/4
DOI: 10.21098/bemp.v22i1

16

Jiang et al.: VENTURE CAPITAL AND CORPORATE INNOVATION INPUT FROM THE PERSPECTI
Venture Capital and Corporate Innovation Input from the Perspective of Syndicated Investment

45

Hellmann, T., and Puri, M. (2002). Venture Capital and the Professionalization of
Start‐Up Firms: Empirical Evidence. Journal of Finance, 57, 169-197.
Hsu, D. H. (2004). What Do Entrepreneurs Pay for Venture Capital Affiliation?.
Journal of Finance, 59, 1805-1844.
Kaplan, S. N., Strömberg, P. (2004). Characteristics, Contracts, and Actions:
Evidence from Venture Capitalist Analyses. Journal of Finance, 59, 2177–2210.
Kortum, S., and Lerner, J. (2000). Assessing the Contribution of Venture Capital to
Innovation. Rand Journal of Economics, 31, 674-692.
Leland, H. E., and Pyle, D. H. (1977). Informational Asymmetries, Financial
Structure, and Financial Intermediation. Journal of Finance, 32, 371-387.
Fan, L. (2015). Financing Constraints, Venture Capital and SME Growth——Based
on the Empirical Study of Chinese A-share Listed Companies. Journal of Hebei
University of Economics and Business, 36, 72-79.
Yao, L., Yeqing, Z., Rui, J., et al. (2017). “Syndicate” Venture Capital and Enterprise
Innovation. Financial Research, 159-175.
Popov, A., and Roosenboom, P. (2012). Venture capital and patented innovation:
evidence from Europe. Economic Policy, 27, 447-482.
Weitao, S., and Liufen, H. (2014). Research on the Impact of Venture Capital
Syndicated Investment on Corporate Governance of the Invested
Companies——Based on the Perspective of Board Structure and Executive
Compensation Contract. Review of Finance and Economics, 64-71.
Tian, X. (2012). The Role of Venture Capital Syndication in Value Creation for
Entrepreneurial Firms. Review of Finance, 16, 245-283.
Tian, X., and Wang, T. Y. (2011). Tolerance for failure and corporate innovation.
The Review of Financial Studies, 27, 211-255.
Lanfang, W., and Yue, H. (2017). Does Venture Capital Promote Innovation
Performance? An Empirical Test Based on Panel Data of Chinese Enterprises.
Financial Research, 01, 177-190.
Chaopeng, W., Shinong, W., Jingya, C and Lu, W. (2012). Empirical Study on the
Impact of Venture Capital on Investing and Financing Behavior of Listed
Companies. Economic Research, 105-119.
Qiaozhen, W. (2009). Path Analysis of Independent Innovation in Venture Capital
Supporting High-tech Industry . Management World, 07, 174-175.
Hao, X., Dizhen, W., and Jin, X. (2015). Venture Capital Background, Shareholding
Ratio and R&D Investment of Start-up Enterprises. Science Research, 33,15471554.
Zhenghua, Z., Yangyang, T., and Lei, W. (2015). The Impact of Joint Venture Capital
on the Technological Innovation Capability of Target Enterprises——Based on
the Empirical Analysis of Listed Companies in Shenzhen GEM. Technological
Economy, 34,24-30.
Zhijie, Z., and Tie, L. (2001). Venture Capital and Financial Innovation in the New
Economy. Financial Research, 03,130-134.
Xueyong, Z., and Li, L. (2011). Venture Capital Background and Corporate IPO:
Market Performance and Intrinsic Mechanism. Economic Research, 6, 118-132.

Published by Bulletin of Monetary Economics and Banking, 2019

17

Bulletin of Monetary Economics and Banking, Vol. 22, No. 1 [2019], Art. 4
46

Bulletin of Monetary Economics and Banking, Volume 22, Number 1, 2019

This page is intentionally left blank

https://bulletin.bmeb-bi.org/bmeb/vol22/iss1/4
DOI: 10.21098/bemp.v22i1

18

